Undertaking an internal or international migration while pregnant, miscarrying, and/or raising a child often entails complex personal, political and moral challenges. For instance, for migrants, on a personal level, the physical and emotional stress associated with certain migration experiences may lead to negative pregnancy outcomes like miscarriage, low birth-weight, stillbirth and gestational diabetes. Politically speaking, birthright citizenship, or the right to become a citizen of the country in which one was born regardless of the citizenship status of one’s parents, has been attacked relentlessly by anti-immigrant groups in places like the United States, Ireland, and New Zealand, leading to its controversial repeal in the latter two countries. Meanwhile, some of the most morally troubling instances of recent migrant abuse have involved the recent, ongoing separations of migrant children from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico border.

Despite the obvious social and political importance of these questions of “maternity and migration,” there is not yet a distinguishable and robust philosophical literature that addresses them directly. There is, however, ample empirical literature and a small set of philosophical articles on this topic, and, additionally, a considerable amount of philosophical work that could be employed to consider the relevant questions from a normative point of a view. My aim in this essay is to provide a summary of this work with a view toward motivating new philosophical research in this important area. “Maternity and migration” is, I hope to show, a topic worthy of sustained philosophical attention, and many conceptual resources are, in fact, already available for doing this work. However, I shall suggest that this (philosophically) under-explored topic indicates a need for alternative approaches to mainstream immigration ethics.

This talk further examines an issue I gave a talk on in Fall 2018. One of the most popular journalistic explanations of political (and other) activity is that certain (often false) narrative stories gives people the beliefs and desires that drive their behavior. In this talk I look at the central problems for such claims.
Suppose Al threatens to beat Betty if she doesn’t agree to give him the money in her pocket, that Al’s threat is credible and sincere, that Betty knows this, and that Betty has no way to get Al to withdraw his threat. It’s clear that if Betty says yes in response to Al’s threat in this case, the consent she gives to let Al take control of her money isn’t valid: the fact that she said yes does not make it permissible for Al to take her money. Now suppose Al threatens to beat Betty if she doesn’t agree to give the money in her pocket to Charles, that Al’s threat is credible and sincere, that Betty and Charles both know this, and that neither Betty nor Charles have a way to get Al to withdraw his threat. It seems natural to suppose that if Betty says yes in response to Al’s threat in this case, the consent she gives to let Charles take control of her money isn’t valid either and that, more generally, if consent is invalid in cases of two-party coercion, it is also invalid in cases of third-party coercion. I will argue in this talk, however, that this is a mistake. While consent is invalid in cases of two-party coercion, it is nonetheless valid in cases of third-party coercion. This has important theoretical consequences for our understanding of what makes consent invalid in standard two-party cases and important practical consequences in such areas as sexual ethics and medical ethics, where instances of third-party coercion can and do occur.