
# Health Information Exchange

Adoption, Usage and Patient Privacy

#### Presentation outline

- Introduction
- 3 papers in *ACM TMIS*, *JAMIA* and *ISR*
- Ongoing research
- Q & A

### Health Information Exchange



### Health Information Exchange

#### • Benefits:

Reduces costs and increases quality of healthcare services (Fontaine et al. 2010; Hincapie et al. 2010)

#### • Challenges:


Its adoption rate is much lower than initial expectations (Agarwal et al. 2010)

Interoperability (Audet et al., 2004), governance, financing and policy vision (West and Friedman, 2012), privacy (Miller and Tucker, 2009)

### Multi-Sided Platform



# Network Externalities





#### **Network Externalities**


- Within group (direct) externalities
- Between group (indirect) externalities

























### Paper #1


## Network Effects in Health Information Exchange Growth

(2013, ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems 4 (1), 1-21)

#### Contributions

- Develop a diffusion model that can incorporate:
  - Market heterogeneity
  - Network externalities (direct and indirect)
- Demonstrate the network externalities and the role of patient flow in HIE growth among primary care physicians and specialists

### Diffusion model for Multisided platforms



### Diffusion model for Multisided platforms

Coefficient of imitation from other primary care doctors 
$$Y_1(t) = m_1 \frac{1 - e^{-(q_1 + p_1)t + \frac{q_{21}}{m_2}Y_2(t)(\frac{1}{q_1 + p_1} \ln \frac{q_1}{p_1} - t)}}{\frac{q_1}{p_1} e^{-(q_1 + p_1)t + \frac{q_{21}}{m_2}Y_2(t)(\frac{1}{q_1 + p_1} \ln \frac{q_1}{p_1} - t)}} + 1$$

$$Y_2(t) = m_2 \frac{1 - e^{-(p_2 + q_2)t + \frac{q_{12}}{m_1}Y_1(t)(\frac{1}{p_2 + q_2}\ln\frac{q_2}{p_2} - t)} - \frac{q_{12}}{p_2m_1}Y_1(t)e^{-(p_2 + q_2)t + \frac{q_{12}}{m_1}Y_1(\frac{1}{p_2 + q_2}\ln\frac{q_2}{p_2} - t)}}{\frac{q_2}{p_2}e^{-(p_2 + q_2)t + \frac{q_{12}}{m_1}m_1Y_1(t)(\frac{1}{p_2 + q_2}\ln\frac{q_2}{p_2} - t)} + 1}$$



#### Data

#### Longitudinal adoption data over the period of 07-2008 to 07-2011

Participating Practice*	Physician	Specialty	Participation Date	Print 🚍	EMR to EMR Exchange	Results Delivery Enabled
Balanced Living Chiropractic	Niemiec, Steven	CHIROPRACTOR	April, 2013	9		
Balanced Living Chiropractic	NiemiecKlimek, Katelyn	CHIROPRACTOR	April, 2013	8		
Balanced Living Chiropractic	Phalen, Kevin	CHIROPRACTOR	April, 2013	8		
Batavia Pediatrics	DeRosa, Daniela	STUDENT IN AN ORGANIZED HEALTH CARE EDUCATION/TRAINING PROGRAM	February, 2011	8		
Batavia Pediatrics	Haitz, Nancy	LEGAL MEDICINE	February, 2011			
Batavia Pediatrics	Jain, Lalit	LEGAL MEDICINE	February, 2011			
Batavia Pediatrics	Tenney, Emily	PEDIATRICS	February, 2011			

### Results

Parameter	Estimate	Approx Std. Err.	t Value	Approx $p_r >  t $
p <sub>1</sub>	0.006915	0.00136	5.09	< 0.0001
$q_1$	0.001888	0.000582	3.23	0.0032
$p_2$	0.00872	0.00205	4.25	0.0002
$q_2$	0.003579	0.00121	2.95	0.0065
q <sub>21</sub>	0.015158	0.00387	3.91	0.0003
q <sub>12</sub>	0.03048	0.00742	4.10	0.0006

#### Conclusions

- Primary care physicians and specialists are affected by media differently.
- Direct network effects within each group is different form other groups.
- Indirect network effect between groups exist and is stronger than within group effects.
- The primary care doctors create a very powerful network effect and drive the adoption of specialist.

### Policy implications

- Financial incentives should be targeted toward increasing the participation of primary care physicians.
- Marketing campaigns should be designed to entice word of mouth among physicians.
- HIE advertisements should focus on the value of HIE for specialists.
- Type of members should be considered in evaluating the benefits of HIE.

### Paper #2

### Professional and Geographical Network Effects on Health Information Exchange Growth: Does Proximity Really Matter?

2014, Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 21 (4), 671-678



#### Contributions

- Demonstrate the network externalities and the role of patient flow in HIE growth within two segmentation schemes:
  - Professional proximity
  - Geographical proximity


#### Data

- HIE system logs by 200ver the period of 07-2008 to 07-2011:
  - 500,000 observations
  - 2100 physicians

	HeL_Patient_ID	Opened_Date	A Practice	Result_Type	Ordering_Name
2351	20671	14MAR11:08:58:	Sadashiv S Shen	Lab	Dombrowski, Jacqu
2352	41668	16MAR11:12:56:	Sadashiv S Shen	Lab	SCHULTZ, RAYM
2353	41668	16MAR11:12:57:	Sadashiv S Shen	Lab	SCHULTZ, RAYM
2354	57880	08MAR11:09:41:	Sadashiv S Shen	Radiology	COOLEY, CRAIG
2355	167864	10MAR11:14:54:	Sadashiv S Shen	Lab	ADDAGATLA, SUJ
2356	167864	10MAR11:14:54:	Sadashiv S Shen	Lab	ADDAGATLA, SUJ

### **Professional Proximity**

- The ratio of common patients between each pair of medical specialty is identified
- The medical specialties with highest ratio of common patients are clustered together



### Results

Parameter	Description	Estimate	Std. Err.	t-value	$P_r >  t $
q <sub>11</sub>	emulation effect within group 1	0.1201	0.0397	3.02	0.0050
q <sub>22</sub>	emulation effect within group 2	0.0938	0.0291	3.23	0.0030
q <sub>33</sub>	emulation effect within group 3	0.1400	0.0596	2.35	0.0254
$p_1$	innovation effect in group 1	0.0138	0.0072	1.91	0.0655
$p_2$	innovation effect in group 2	0.0190	0.0058	3.23	0.0027
$p_3$	innovation effect in group 3	0.0186	0.0105	1.77	0.0864
q <sub>12</sub>	emulation effect from group 1 on group 2	0.0409	0.0201	1.95	0.0602
q <sub>13</sub>	emulation effect from group 1 on group 3	0.3716	0.1262	2.94	0.0061
q <sub>21</sub>	emulation effect from group 2 on group 1	-0.0304	0.0673	-0.45	0.6540
q <sub>23</sub>	emulation effect from group 2 on group 3	-0.2205	0.1509	-1.46	0.1540
q <sub>31</sub>	emulation effect from group 3 on group 1	0.0564	0.0355	1.59	0.1221
q <sub>32</sub>	emulation effect from group 3 on group 2	0.0195	0.0150	1.31	0.2002


#### Conclusions

- The flow of shared patients among the specialties within a cluster creates significant network externalities within each cluster.
- The clusters which do not considerably share patients between each other do not create network externalities between clusters.
  - HIE adoption is driven by the perceived value of the system for each specialty as a function of shared patients with others.

## Policy implications

• To design effective HIE promotion policies, the flow of patients between different medical providers should be taken into account.

## Geographical proximity



### Results

Parameter	Description	Estimate	Std. Err.	t-value	$P_r >  t $
$p_1$	innovation effect in urban group	0.010086	0.00190	5.31	<.0001
q <sub>11</sub>	emulation effect within urban group	0.003148	0.00160	1.96	0.0574
q <sub>21</sub>	emulation effect from rural group on urban group	0.078106	0.0393	1.99	0.0546
$p_2$	innovation effect in rural group	0.015343	0.000250	61.43	<.0001
q <sub>22</sub>	emulation effect within rural group	0.016824	0.000682	24.66	<.0001
q <sub>12</sub>	emulation effect from urban group on rural group	0.057861	0.00290	19.97	<.0001

#### Conclusions

- Urban physicians are highly affected by marketing campaigns and media
- Urban physicians are not affected by network externalities
- Word of Mouth is a strong driver of HIE adoption in rural areas
- Rural physicians follow the lead of urban physicians

### Policy implications

- Along with the previous results, chicken and egg problem in HIE is solved:
  - Get primary physicians in the urban areas on board
  - Approach specialties who share more patients with primary care doctors
  - Create cluster seeds and then grow them according to patient flow

### Paper #3

Health Information Exchange as a Multi-sided Platform: Adoption, Usage and Practice Involvement in Service Co-Production


(forthcoming at Information Systems Research)

#### Contributions

- Social network theory is applied to study the drivers of HIE adoption and *use* at a much more granular level.
- Big brother effect (institutional isomorphism) and the value of different services of HIE for each provider is taken into account


### Network of patients

- Nodes are practices
- Links are shared patients
- Size represents degree centrality
- The more patients received from others, the more valuable HIE is



### Network of physicians

- Nodes are practices
- Links are shared physicians
- Size represents Betweenness centrality
- Higher degree of betweenness centrality leads to higher knowledge about HIE



#### Results

Variable	Coefficient	estimate	Std. Dev.	T value	P value	VIF
Intercept	$\beta_0$	1.179546	0.8459	1.39	0.1635	0
Lab service value	$\beta_1$	0.125102	0.0290	4.31	<.0001	1.95202
Radiology service value	$\beta_2$	0.3823	0.0445	8.60	<.0001	2.84985
Trans. Service value	$\beta_3$	0.268445	0.0461	5.83	<.0001	2.26245
Tenure	$\beta_4$	0.12085	0.00863	14.01	<.0001	1.79635
Tenure <sup>2</sup>	$\beta_5$	-0.005436	0.000857	-6.34	<.0001	1.67049
Rural location	$\beta_6$	0.231534	0.1817	1.27	0.2028	1.04608
Market Share	$\beta_7$	0.03138	0.0123	2.55	0.0109	1.09640
Nurse ratio	$\beta_8$	1.289451	0.2252	5.73	<.0001	1.08793
Between. centrality	$\beta_9$	4.917475	1.0422	4.72	<.0001	1.42364
In-degree centrality	$\beta_{10}$	0.000499	0.000073	6.81	<.0001	6.68474
Out-degree centrality	$\beta_{11}$	-0.00006	0.000057	-1.00	0.3197	5.90712

#### Conclusions

- The value of different HIE services for each practice is unique
- Practices learn how to use HIE through experience and shared physicians and enhance their level of use as they learn more about HIE
- Nurses are an important driver of HIE use. They are the real end-users
- Competition affects HIE use
- Referred patients increases HIE use

### Policy implications

- The financial incentives to enhance the use of HIE should be tailored for each practices based on their specialty, needs, *market share* and *experience* with HIE
- Training programs to use HIE should target *Nurses* and doctors with multiple affiliations

### Survival analysis of HIE adoption

 How long it takes for a practice to adopt HIE? and how this time can be reduced?

### Results

Parameter	Coefficient	Estimate	Standard Error	p-value	VIF
Intercept	$\beta_0$	7.527131	0.028957	<0.0001	0
Between. Centrality	$\beta_1$	-1.807089	0.837932	0.0312	1.06920
In-Degree centrality	$\beta_2$	-0.683314	0.109088	<0.0001	4.76307
Out-degree centrality	$\beta_3$	0.000152	0.002379	0.9492	6.05724
Service demand	$\beta_4$	-0.000127	0.000022213	0.0005	2.55557
Practice efficiency	$\beta_5$	-0.088004	0.000958	< 0.001	1.42841
Rural location	$\beta_6$	-0.111545	0.012691	<0.0001	1.05932
Market share	$\beta_7$	-0.017720	0.004283	< 0.0001	1.09157
% of common patients with large practices	β <sub>8</sub>	-0.00008523	0.000001739	<0.0001	3.16754
% of common physicians with large practices	β,	-0.094151	0.019978	0.0005	2.07404

#### Conclusions

- Knowledge about HIE a significant driver of HIE adoption
- HIE adoption is very well informed decision and is driven by perceived value of HIE for each practice
- Big brothers are significantly reducing adoption time

### Policy implications

- Larger practices should first be incentivized to join HIE
- Advertising/training programs should be designed to educate physicians on the benefits of HIE and how to use it

### Ongoing Research

- Patient privacy and disclosure of medical information of HIE system
- The outcomes of HIE in reducing costs and increasing quality of healthcare
- Designing pricing strategies of HIE platforms

## Thank you!

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