Writing & Speaking Assignment
BLW 331-Real Estate Law I
| Written and Oral Assignments: Students choosing the mentorship
option will be required to submit a paper and discuss it in an oral presentation
in class. The paper will be based on the student's actual experiences
in the real estate field with a mentor from the real estate community.
Mentors will be assigned based on what area of real estate the student selects.
Examples include real estate law, property management, mortgage lending,
real estate brokerage and others. Each students will be expected to meet
with his or her mentor about 8-12 hours throughout the semester. For the
paper and oral presentation, each student is expected to relate, as much
as possible, any legal, ethical and policy issues which he or she may have
encountered during the mentorship.
The following should, at a minimum, be covered in your paper and
presentation:
Your oral presentation will be on May 7, 2008. |
| Lied Institute for Real Estate Studies Mentorship Requirements/Expectations To further enhance the Mentorship Program new entrance requirements must be met: All participants are required to:
Once a student is accepted into the Mentor Program he or she is expected to: • Meet with Mentor at his/her office for a minimum of 1 hour per week • Maintain professional dress at meetings *Will consider other colleges on a case by case basis Paper Requirement. For those who choose not to do a mentorship but instead a paper, the following information is provided for you as a guide.
PLEASE SEE BELOW AN EXAMPLE OF HOW TO CRITIQUE AN ARTICLE. THIS EXAMPLE COMES FROM THE "DIGEST OF SELECTED ARTICLES" SECTION OF THE REAL ESTATE LAW JOURNAL. Real Estate Law Journal Spring 2007 DIGEST OF SELECTED ARTICLES Murray S. Levin [FNa1] Copyright (c) 2007 West Group; Murray S. Levin Real Estate Agent Fiduciary Duties, Licensing and Discipline, and Practice Issues In the best selling book Freakonomics, [FN1] award winning University of Chicago economist Steven D. Levitt amused a wide based readership with data and observations not only indicative of dishonest practices in the world of Japanese Sumo wrestlers and Chicago school teachers under pressure to produce higher student standardized test scores, but he also pointed his freaky finger of economics at real estate agents. Focusing on data from the sale of 100,000 houses in suburban Chicago and controlling for a number of variables, Levitt observed that agents kept their own houses (3,000 transactions in the sample) on the market an average of ten days longer and these sales yielded prices that were over three percent higher. Levitt posited that when real estate agents are selling their own homes they hold out for the best offer and when selling on behalf of others they work to have the seller take the first decent offer that comes along. In Levitt's view, this behavior is the product of information asymmetry (“expert” real estate agents have better information than “amateur” home owners) and the real estate agent commission incentive system. [FN2] While commissions are often thought of as aligning the interests of the principal and agent, that is not necessarily what happens. For example, regarding the sale of a $300,000 house, holding out a little longer and working for, say, a $310,000 price will yield approximately an additional $9,400 for the seller (net of commission). The typical individual selling agent might receive an additional $150 (i.e. 1.5%). [FN3] Levitt suggests it is unlikely the agent will put forth extra time and energy for this meager return. [FN4] By the way, although Levitt has focused attention on questionable real estate agent practices, Levitt very much values the services that real estate licensees provide, and he foresees a remedied future involving different compensation structures. This would include arrangements involving flat fees for listing properties and hourly rates for additional services such as open houses and showings. His prediction, however, also includes a dramatic decline in fees and a shakeout with many people leaving the profession and the ones who remain doing much more volume at a lower payment rate per transaction. [FN5] Real estate licensees very often owe their clients (especially sellers) a fiduciary duty, and in states where the parties may agree that a real estate licensee serves neither as a seller's agent nor as a buyer's agent and instead, for example, as a transaction agent or facilitator, the real estate professional typically still owes some fiduciary-like duties such as a duty not to disclose the motivating factors for a seller to sell or that a seller is willing to accept less than the listing price for the property. [FN6] The first article provides additional support for a charge that real estate licensees are often confronted by a conflict of interest that can result in failing to abide by such fiduciary duties. This article, however, is short on prescription. It is natural to act on self-interest. I find that many of my business students have difficulty recognizing conflicts of interest, come to my classes generally unfamiliar with the fiduciary duty concept, and have a difficult time (even in the classroom setting) accepting the idea that one can and should be legally obligated to subordinate one's own interests to those of another. Through pre-licensing processes and continuing education requirements, real estate regulators and educators need to help practitioners identify such conflicts of interest and constructively relate to them. The second article is a comparative study of the licensing and disciplinary regulation of real estate professionals, attorneys, and accountants in the state of Florida. It provides an interesting look at one state's approach and experience promoting sound professional practices. The third article, regarding the clash over who should be able to prepare conveyancing documents, relates nicely to the first two articles in that the author's position is premised in the belief that real estate professionals are not as inclined or obligated to serve the interests of their clients as are attorneys. The final two articles reported in this digest address the duty to make disclosures in connection with residential real estate transactions - a leading cause of litigation for real estate agents and their clients. Disclosure serves not only to inform buyers, but also to protect sellers and real estate licensees from liability. A look at the extensive California disclosure requirements may elicit a gasp from practitioners in other states, but appreciation of these disclosure requirements may also serve as an aid for managing the risk of liability. Royce De R. Barondes and V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., Examining Compliance with Fiduciary Duties: A Study of Real Estate Agents, 84 OR. L. REV. 681 (2005) This article examines data suggesting that there is a tendency among real estate agents who specialize in selling to further their own interests and act contrary to the interests of sellers. The authors first summarize the legal duties owed by residential real estate agents. Next they describe other research regarding whether real estate agents shirk their duties or commit other malfeasance. Lastly, they present the results of their study of a sample of 3,209 single-family transactions in one metropolitan area. The authors recount the experience of the last twenty years in which there have been numerous revisions to state laws governing duties of residential real estate agents. Part of the impetus for these changes in law were high dollar liability cases involving “dual agency”. [FN7] A significant change in the law of many states was the elimination of the traditional rule making a brokerage firm selling another firm's listing to be a subagent of the listing firm, and therefore a fiduciary of the seller. This treatment was criticized as not reflecting the expectation of the parties. Indeed, the often-cited 1983 Federal Trade Commission survey of the perceptions of residential buyers and sellers indicated that 74% of the buyers believed that selling agents represented the buyer. [FN8] A number of other studies confirmed this misconception of legal responsibilities. Lawmakers, with the support of the National Association of Realtors, sought to clarify the real estate agent relationship. Drawing on other recent legal scholarship, [FN9] the authors summarize the several modern legislative approaches. Some states retain the traditional default rule, but clarify procedures for establishing a buyer's agent or a dual agency relationship. Some states now provide that absent an agreement to the contrary, a salesperson working with the buyer is the buyer's agent. Other states follow an approach in which the real estate agent owes heightened duties to “clients” and some lesser duties to “customers”. Other states recognize a “transaction” brokerage relationship with a defined and decreased fiduciary duty. Nearly every state now mandates some disclosure about the agency relationship, [FN10] for example, to make a person aware that an agent with whom the person is working is actually an agent for the other party. The authors explain that requiring enhanced disclosure of agency obligations is sensible if real estate agents do in fact act in accordance with their legal obligations. If agents do not, the enhanced disclosure may be counterproductive. The authors set out to test whether this common assumption that agents abide by their fiduciary duty is accurate. More specifically they test for and find a quantifiable adverse impact on principals (i.e. indicating a failure to abide by certain duties). The authors test two hypotheses: [FN11] 1. Deviations from duties owed to sellers may assist selling agents in securing business. They test this hypothesis by examining whether the participation of a selling agent who specializes in selling is associated with a lower sales price. (If the selling agent is truly serving the seller, one would expect the inverse to be true--i.e. the sale price should be higher.) 2. Intrafirm relationships may limit agent misconduct better than interfirm relationships. (In other words, a selling agent is less likely to take a position contrary to the seller if the selling agent is in the same firm as the listing agent.) They test this hypothesis by examining whether a seller receives a better sales price when the selling agent is with the same firm as the listing agent. The jurisdiction under study had a statute providing that absent a written agreement to the contrary, a selling agent was the subagent of the listing agent and thus an agent of the seller (i.e. the traditional rule). Also, during the period of time under study, it was unusual for parties to deviate from this default relationship. Regarding their first hypothesis, the authors find a statistically significant negative relationship between sales price and the participation of a selling agent who specializes in selling. Findings on the second hypothesis show that the effect is particularly pronounced when selling agent duties are split between two firms. Thus, the authors proclaim that their data supports the view that to secure business, selling agents use actions that decrease the returns to their principals, with some evidence that participation of a listing agent in the same firm as the selling agent partially restrains this activity. The authors conclude that these findings put into question the efficacy of statutory obligations requiring disclosures about the nature of the real estate licensee's legal obligations, since agents conduct is not fully consistent with the duties that are formally owed. The article includes a detailed explanation of the study database and statistical analysis and four tables of statistics. The authors are short on solutions, however, merely stating that appropriate responses “could involve enhanced regulatory enforcement and, as has occurred in some jurisdictions, modification of the duties to restrict fiduciary obligations”. Debra Moss Curtis, Florida Legal Affairs: Licensing and Discipline of Fiscal Professionals in the State of Florida: Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, and Real Estate Professionals, 29 NOVA L. REV. 339 (2005) This study focuses on the three licensed professionals in which the public places fiscal trust and responsibility - attorneys, CPAs, and real estate professionals. They are distinguishable from other licensed professionals in that they provide basic services that involve holding, accounting for, and transferring money. While the public may place the same fiscal trust in these different categories of professionals, these professionals are not treated the same by the Florida licensing authorities. Florida real estate professionals and CPAs are regulated through the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (“DBPR”); attorneys are self-regulated through the Florida Bar. This study examines and compares licensing and discipline systems and disciplinary actions for these three professions. For licensing requirements and discipline systems, the author provides detailed information for each profession separately and then follows with a comparative summary. The disciplinary data is presented in comparative tables. A first licensing difference between the three categories of professionals is the educational (and at least indirectly age) requirements. While CPAs must complete a baccalaureate degree with a major in accounting (including some specific courses) and attorneys must complete a specific post graduate degree, real estate professionals must only have a high school diploma or its equivalent and be at least eighteen years of age. Florida real estate professionals must, however, also take an approved prelicensing course consisting of sixty-three classroom hours. A second level of comparison is the licensing examination process. The author asserts that differences in the examination methods set a different tone and level of accessibility for future professionals. The real estate exams are entirely crafted and administered by the state and given in a computer format at many qualified private testing centers throughout the state with instant notification of success or failure at the testing site. The CPA exam is administered by a national organization that has recently switched to an internet format. The four-part fourteen-hour exam can be taken in separate parts during an eighteen month period of time. Feedback is available no sooner than two to four weeks after an exam segment is taken. Attorney exams consist of a combination of a state and national exam. Attorneys must pass a professional ethics exam administered three times yearly. The main bar exam is a paper-based two-day exam given on only two specific dates a year at one central location. Feedback regarding a passing score generally comes after a delay of several months. A third comparative difference in the licensure systems is the manner of treatment of potential licensees who are licensed in other jurisdictions. The real estate system is by far the most lenient, having a mutual recognition system with twenty percent of the licensing states once additional minimum standards are met. At the other extreme, the Florida attorney system forbids any reciprocity for attorneys licensed in other states. The author describes the accountancy system as a complicated one that does, however, allow for reciprocity under certain defined circumstances. The author makes a final point of comparison with respect to ongoing administrative requirements. Real estate licensees and CPAs pay biannual licensing fees of less than $100; attorneys pay a fee of at least $265 per year. Real estate licensees face a heavy continuing education requirement during the first two-year license renewal period (delineated courses of not more than forty-five hours for sales associates and sixty hours for brokers), followed by a comparatively light load (a minimum of fourteen hours) of continuing education for each two year period thereafter. The continuing education requirement for attorneys is thirty hours over successive three-year periods. CPAs are required to complete at least eighty hours of continuing education during each two-year renewal period and must also pass an open book exam on Florida accountancy law and rules. Regarding discipline systems the author details the Florida real estate professional disciplinary process. It includes a written complaint system available on the DBPR website. When a complaint is filed, a first step is review by a complaint analyst for determination whether the complaint includes sufficient information. When an investigation is undertaken, the DBPR furnishes the licensee a copy of the complaint, and that person then has twenty days to submit a written response. A probable cause panel, including two members of the Florida Real Estate Commission, determine if probable cause exists that a licensee violated Florida real estate statutes. As an alternative to a complaint being heard by a probable cause panel, regarding minor violations (there are twenty listed behaviors, including for example, failure to maintain an office entrance sign), the DBPR may issue a licensee a “notice of noncompliance” requiring rectification in fifteen days. When there is a finding of probable cause and there is a disputed issue of material fact, a formal hearing on the complaint may be heard by an administrative law judge. There are also opportunities for mediation and judicial review of final orders. Statutes and regulations identify thirty-nine separate violations and corresponding penalties. Disciplines include reprimand, probation (including imposition of conditions such as attending certain courses), suspensions (ranging from ninety days to five years), permanent license revocation, fines of varying dollar amounts (typically $500 or $1,000), and combinations of these disciplinary actions. There are forty-one additional violations, [FN12] including for example, failing to secure permission of parties before placing trust funds in an interest bearing account, which the Commission can discharge with only a citation, generally consisting of a fine between $100 and $500. The author identifies several significant differences for the three professions. The first major difference is the degree of certainty. Real estate professionals [FN13] and CPAs [FN14] are prenoticed with a specific list of behaviors and specific penalties whereas the rules governing attorney behavior include broad categories of actions with much room for interpretation and discretionary disciplinary response. Other examples of differences include the manner in which discipline is finalized (DBPR utilization of disciplinary board and administrative law judge; attorney discipline is through judges and ultimately the highest court of the state), utilization of fines (DBPR fines for real estate professionals and CPAs; fines are not regularly part of the attorney discipline process), and the nature and degree of public access to disciplinary information (the author characterizes the DBPR information regarding real estate professionals as the “most forthcoming”, including, for example, an easily searchable index for licensed professionals). The disciplinary statistics, presented as annual figures for 1996 through 2003, show that there are far more real estate licensees than attorneys or CPAs. The latest numbers are real estate licensees 249,871, [FN15] attorneys 72,933, [FN16] CPAs 35,016. The number of disciplinary complaints filed for the latest year are real estate licensees 4,826, attorneys 8,671, CPAs 249. For real estate licensees and CPAs there are also the following figures for the number of complaints for which probable cause was found: 360 and 59 respectively. There is no comparable probable cause process for attorneys. The disciplinary dispositions (all files closed for real estate licensees and CPAs and final orders of discipline for attorneys) [FN17] for the latest year are real estate licensees 416, attorneys 384, CPAs 65. Other data shows that there are higher percentages of women disciplined among real estate licensees (the few years reported range from 24% to 31%) than for attorneys (range from 11% to 14%). The author speculates this is a product of larger numbers of women being members of the real estate profession for many years and that younger attorneys are more sheltered from client contact, for example within law firms, than younger real estate licensees who deal directly with individual clients right away. There are also data presentations regarding specific disciplinary sanctions, discipline by geographic location, and percentages of licensees disciplined. The author makes several key observations. Real estate complaints with probable cause are a small fraction of the total number of complaints. Attorneys who were disciplined were far more likely to be suspended than real estate licensees. License revocations were proportionately equal across the three professions. Comparatively small numbers of attorney sanctions involve probation. This is probably a product of discipline system differences in which attorneys receive just one disciplinary sanction whereas the system for real estate professionals and CPAs allows more than one disciplinary sanction to be imposed together (e.g. suspension, probation, and a fine). The percentages of total licensees who are disciplined each year is very small. For the most recent year 0.17% of real estate licensees (a distinct decline from 0.62% in 1999), 0.19% of CPAs, and 0.53% of attorneys were disciplined. The author professes that this could be good or bad depending on whether it is a function of: (1) good professional practices, or (2) lax enforcement by a regulatory system that uses fellow professionals or in the case of attorneys a self regulatory system. The author concludes the article noting that some professionals operate under more than one license (e.g. attorney and real estate broker). Also, lines are not always clear as to what fiscal activity falls under which profession - e.g. real estate professionals and CPAs give counsel and advice with legal consequences, and real estate professionals prepare legal documents. She cautions consumers to be alert to the differences among the professions. Michael C. Ksiazek, Note: The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Justification for Restricting Conveyancing to Attorneys, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 169 (2004) Without much evidence or authority, the author asserts that non-lawyer conveyancers are more likely to conduct real estate transactions with their own interests in mind and are less likely to adequately consider and represent the interests of their clients. Consequently, the practice of conveyancing should be limited to attorneys. This article describes how the various provisions of the ABA Model rules of Professional Conduct (which have been adopted into law by many states) establish a forceful legal obligation for attorneys to serve the interests of their clients. These include: Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information; Rules 1.7 and 1.8 regarding Conflict of Interest: Current Clients; Rule 1.9, Duties to Former Clients; Rule 1.10, Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule; Rule 1.15, Safekeeping Property; Rule 1.16, Declining or Terminating Representation; and Rule 1.18, Duties to Prospective Clients. Members of other occupations who seek to engage in layperson conveyancing are not obligated to such an extent to protect the interests of their clients. A foremost argument favoring other service providers as conveyancers centers on a free market justification (including, for example, lower cost service to consumers) and criticism of lawyers for engaging in anti-competitive protectionism. The author cursorily dismisses this line of reasoning, asserting that the use of even simple standardized legal forms “does not remove the need for legal judgment and analysis.” (It seems by that standard that no one other than a lawyer would ever be allowed to prepare/complete any written document.) The author does cite to some cases holding that most conveyancing constitutes the practice of law, but the authority and evidence is less clear than this work seems to suggest. [FN18] E. Lee Worsham, Must Information in the Public Record be Disclosed to Buyers of residential Real Property and May It Be Misrepresented?, 80 FLA. BAR J. 33 (2006) This article explores the question whether a seller or agent/broker has a duty to disclose to a buyer of residential real estate facts contained in a public record. Focusing on Florida law, the author explains that while courts have held that purchasers are deemed to have knowledge of public records, such as land use regulations, it is questionable whether a prospective buyer should have to “root around the bowels of the courthouse for those surveys, plats, and records which would verify or contradict a seller's representations about the property.” [FN19] Florida law builds on a general proposition first stated by California courts: “where the seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property … and also knows that such facts are not known to or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer.” [FN20] The operative question then becomes what in the public records is within the “reach of the diligent attention and observation of a buyer,” and what records are beyond that reach? The author recounts the facts, parties' arguments, and judicial disposition of several related Florida cases brought by purchasers claiming damages or rescission based on misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact. These facts, which were arguably discoverable from public records, included matters such as nondisclosure of a municipal code enforcement violation associated with a growing fine of $57,000, [FN21] nondisclosure of seasonal flooding which could have been discovered through flood criteria incorporated in county regulations, [FN22] misrepresentation regarding an amount of acreage, [FN23] nondisclosure that a structure with a bedroom on a ground floor at an elevation of only four feet above sea level violated county regulations, [FN24] misrepresentation that a lot was a lakefront lot while a recorded plat accurately showed that the lot ended 100 feet from water's edge and that there was a conservation tract between the lot and the water, [FN25] misrepresentation that a nearby off-site parcel was a permanent natural preserve when in fact it was to be a school as shown on a site plan, [FN26] and negligent misrepresentation regarding zoning. [FN27] Based on Florida case law, the author expresses a number of specific interrelated conclusions and recommendations, some of which follow here. Buyers are charged with knowing facts that are clearly revealed through a parcel's chain of title. Otherwise, the question of whether facts in the public record are within reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer is a question of fact. Matters contained in applicable land use regulations probably do not need to be disclosed, but known nonconformity of a property to land use regulations should be disclosed. For misrepresentations about matters outside the property being sold, there is a factual issue whether the recipient of the representations was justified in relying upon the truth of the representations, but under such circumstances it is unlikely the courts will expect the buyer to conduct an extensive investigation into the public records. Regarding negligent misrepresentations, liability pertains only if the recipient of the information justifiably relied on the erroneous information, and comparative negligence principles are applicable to such cases. Moreover, in a great many situations, the seller or broker of residential property probably does not have a duty to disclose information that is available in public records. Yet, because buyers of residential properties are not expected to conduct the degree of due diligence customarily associated with commercial real estate transactions, when in doubt a prudent seller or broker should disclose facts that materially affect the value of a residential property, even though such information can be found in the public records. Matt Lilligren, Real Estate: When in Doubt Point It Out: Chapter 66 Attempts to Clarify California's Residential Real Estate Disclosure Obligations, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 941 (2005) As in many other states, it is well-settled common law in California that sellers of real property have a duty to disclose known “facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property.” Additionally, California has some of the most extensive statutory disclosure requirements in the country, requiring the use of more than a dozen separate disclosure documents for a residential real estate transaction. [FN28] This article reports on amendments to the California disclosure statutes that went into effect in 2005. The California Association of Realtors was a sponsor of these amendments that are directed at clarifying previous disclosure requirements regarding airport influence, [FN29] industrial use, [FN30] and natural hazards. [FN31] Regarding the potential influence of an airport on a property, the main effect of the amendments is to coordinate and to a large degree preempt local requirements for airport disclosures. Continuing from previous law, developers are required to disclose whether their property is located within an airport influence area. Sellers of existing homes are obligated to disclose any knowledge of airport-related effects on the property. An airport influence area can cover between twelve to forty-five square miles depending on the size and features of an airport. Regarding industrial use, in addition to the existing requirement that a seller disclose whether the property is zoned to allow an industrial use, the amendment requires a seller to provide notice of any known adjacent industrial use or that the property is “affected by a nuisance created by such use.” Lastly, the amendments modify the required Natural Hazard Disclosure Statement (regarding flood areas, potential flooding, fire hazard severity zones, wildland areas with substantial forest fire risks, earthquake fault zones, and seismic hazard zones). The amendments allow residential property sellers, as an alternative to making representations about their own knowledge, to indicate that they have “exercised good faith in the selection of a third party provider” (an expert). When such an expert is used, the expert is then liable for the information that he or she provides. The seller is no longer required to verify the findings of the third party expert. The very extensive California regime of disclosure continues to evolve based in large part on input from real estate industry professionals. [FNa1]. Murray S. Levin, J.D., M.B.A., Professor of Business Law at the University of Kansas School of Business. [FN1]. Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (2005). [FN2]. Levitt was not the first to point to potentially conflicting forces at play associated with real estate commission structures. I touched upon this issue twenty years ago. See Murray S. Levin, Overstating the Value of Property To Induce A Listing, 24 KAN. L. REV. 757, 787-794 (1986). [FN3]. Assuming a common arrangement in which the total commission (e.g. 6 to 7 %) will be divided among a listing agent, a selling agent, and their respective brokers. [FN4]. See also Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Cracking the Real Estate Code, Wired Magazine (http:// www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.05/realestate.html) (accessed Dec. 22, 2006). [FN5]. http://www.freakonomics.com/blog/2006/01/03/more-bad-news-for-real-estate-agents/ (accessed Dec. 29, 2006). [FN6]. E.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,113(f) (2006). [FN7]. E.g. Bokusky v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 3-92 CIV. 223, 1993 WL 515827 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 1993); Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771 (Dist. Ct. Minn. June 17, 1993). News accounts indicate that the two cases were settled for a total of $19.9 million. [FN8]. Gerard R. Butters, Consumers' Experiences with Real Estate Brokers: A Report on the Consumer Survey of the Federal Trade Commission's Residential Real Estate Brokerage Investigation, 24-26, in L.A. Reg'l Office, Fed. Trade Comm'n, THE RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY (1983). [FN9]. Ann Morales Olazabal, Redefining Realtor Relationships and Responsibilities: The Failure of State Regulatory Responses, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.. 65, 100-10 (2003). This article provides an excellent description and analysis of the various state statutes addressing the agency relationship of real estate licensees. [FN10]. Id. at 112. [FN11]. These “hypotheses” are stated in a variety of muddled ways at various points in the article. I have opted to go with the most succinct statement from the article's “Conclusion” section. [FN12]. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61J2-24.002(2). [FN13]. FLA. STAT. § 475.42 (2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61J2-24.001. [FN14]. FLA. STAT. § § 473, 322, 323 (2006); FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 61H1-36.004(2). [FN15]. This number is not a true head count since it also includes corporations and schools regulated by the Real estate Commission. The author indicates it is not possible to extrapolate only the number of sales associates and broker licensees. This, of course, does hamper the process of making accurate comparisons across professions. [FN16]. This includes both active and inactive members, again putting into question some of the cross-profession comparisons that the author makes. [FN17]. This is somewhat of an “apples and oranges comparison.” [FN18]. See e.g., Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyancers-Empirical Evidence Says “Cease Fire!”, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 423 (1999). [FN19]. Azam v. M/I Schottenstein Homes, Inc., 761 So. 2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2000). [FN20]. Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). [FN21]. Solorzano v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 896 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (remanding the case, questioning whether the buyer had adequate time to research the violations). [FN22]. Nelson v. Wiggs, 699 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (affirming decision against buyer who very significantly was a building contractor). [FN23]. Besett v. Basnett, 389 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1980) (involving assertion that acreage could have been determined by plat recorded in the official records). [FN24]. Revitz v. Terrell, 572 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (ruling for buyer, emphasizing that broker knew or should have known that the very low flood insurance premium was based on false circumstances). [FN25]. Fry v. J. E. Jones Const. Co., 567 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). [FN26]. Azam v. M/I Shottenstein Homes, Inc., 761 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) affirmed M/I Shottenstein Homes v. Azam, 813 So. 2d at 94 (Fla. 2002). [FN27]. Gilchrist Timber Co.v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 696 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1997). [FN28]. The California Real Estate Commission publishes a disclosure booklet that includes specified disclosure forms. See Disclosures in Real Property Transactions (6th ed. 2005) which is available at http:// www.dre.ca.gov/disclosures.htm (accessed Dec. 30, 2006). [FN29]. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 11010 (2006); CAL. CIV. CODE § § 1102.6, 1103.4, 1353 (2006). [FN30]. CAL. CIV. CODE § § 1102.17, 1102.6 (2006). [FN31]. CAL. CIV. CODE § § 1102.4, 1103.2, 1103.4 (2006). 35 Real Est. L. J. 646 END OF DOCUMENT |